INTRODUCTION
There cannot be any doubt that the rule of law is one of the most elementary and important features of the European Union and the process of European integration as a whole. Without denying the nature of the integration as a genuinely political process, it is quite obvious that the rule of law is a truly fundamental factor for the supranational European Union which appears in legal texts as in legal practice as a true cornerstone of the entire construction. The most prominent placing of the rule of law in article 2 of the Treaty on European Union ("TEU") amongst the values, on which the European Union is founded, might constitute the formal basis of the truly essential nature of the rule of law for the establishment of the European Union. The well-known reports of the Commission on the rule of law in accession countries might be another symbolic element of general political visibility in this respect. 1 The particular significance of the rule of law for the European Union is explained, better than in any source of legal or judicial nature, in the speech that Walter Hallstein gave in March 1962 at the University of Padua on the European Economic Community as a Community of law, in which he stated:
This Community was not created by military power or political pressure, but owes its existence to a constitutive legal act. It also lives in accordance with fixed rules of law and its institutions are subject to judicial review. In place of power and its manipulation, the balance of powers, the But, as it is the case with other fundamental constitutional principles which have soon found general recognition, the real challenge with which the rule of law is confronted in practice is not a lack of acceptance or a sentiment of hidden regret. It is rather the seemingly self-evident respect of the rule of law in western democracies, which goes somehow strangely along with the feeling that one does not need to be engaged for a legal principle which is as obvious as the rule of law and therefore does not require our principal attentiveness. Of course, nothing is more profoundly wrong and dangerous than this kind of reasoning, which is in full contrast with the general experience which the judiciary has made throughout the western world. Whether you take the practice of the US Supreme Court or of the German Constitutional Court on the national level or of the European Court of Human Rights or of the European Court of 2. See WALTER HALLSTEIN, Die EWG-Eine Rechtsgemeinschaft. Rede anlässlich der Ehrenpromotion (Universität Padua, 12. März 1962 ), in EUROPÄISCHE REDEN 341, 343-44 (1979 (translation provided by author).
3. Id. at 344.
Justice ("ECJ") on the supranational level, the experience is essentially identical in the sense that the democratic process does not offer sufficient and sufficiently effective guarantees against an abuse of power. If the king was said to do no wrong, governments and legislators in democratic systems certainly can do wrong and, based upon our experience, will do so. This is why it is and will remain a continued task of the judiciary to ensure the respect of the rule of law. In the European Union, this is in principle no different than in its Member States, but it is of course subject to a significant number of specific considerations in the respective contexts in which the scrutiny of the ECJ intervenes.
I. THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ ON THE RULE OF LAW
Though it took the ECJ until 1986 to formally adhere to the words of Walter Hallstein that the European Union is by its nature a community of law, 4 the oeuvre of the Court is, since the very beginnings, closely linked to the development of principles which form an integral part of the rule of law as it is recognized throughout the national legal orders of its Member States.
A. Foundations in the Early Jurisprudence of the Court
Despite the specific European context, in which the rule of law is placed hereby explaining the particular importance of the other values proclaimed in article 2 TEU, such as human dignity, freedom, and equality, as well as non-discrimination and human rights in general, the Court's jurisprudence on elements of the rule of law originated from a rather traditional perspective concerning the principles of legality, legal certainty, confidence in the stability of a legal situation, and proportionality. As it already became apparent in the equally famous and fundamental Algera judgment, in which a comparative study had shown that the principle of non-revocability of administrative measures giving rise to individual rights is a legal principle generally acknowledged in the legal orders of all Member States, it would amount to a denial of justice, if the Court would have based its judgment on the absence of an explicit rule in the secondary law of the Union without having recourse to the general principles of Union law as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. 6 But, since the specific conditions for the application of such general principles vary from one national legal order to another, the recognition of general principles of Union law derived from the common constitutional traditions always entails a creative element and produces a harmonizing effect which goes beyond the democratic legitimacy offered by the secondary legislation of the Union. 7 Being a paramount example of judge made law in the European Union, the evolution of the Court's jurisprudence in this field is characterized by a cautious step-by-step approach and a particular self-restraint. 8 Nonetheless, over the past fiftyseven years since the Algera judgment, the Court has recognized a wide range of principles which form an integral part of the rule of law. The most prominent examples are substantive rules derived from the principle of legality, 9 the principle of legal situation); Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr-und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, Case C-11/70, [1970] certainty, 10 the principle of confidence in the stability of a legal situation, 11 and, in particular, the principle of proportionality. 12 Furthermore, the Court has recognized a significant number of procedural guarantees as an embodiment of the rule of law such as the right to be heard 13 
B. The Increasing Importance of Comparative Considerations in Legal Reasoning
Given the particular importance of the role which the Court has attributed to comparative considerations in the evolution of general principles of Union law, it appears regrettable from an outside perspective that the methodology which the Court applies is not made fully transparent. 17 The rather short references which are contained in the Court's judgments 18 indeed only constitute the "tip of the iceberg" 19 and are based on extensive considerations contained in the conclusions of the Advocate General 20 and on preliminary research done by the internal service of the Court. 21 This lack of full methodological transparency, which has somehow been compensated for by a particularly intense treatment of the comparative method in academic writing of different generations of judges of the Court, 22 is certainly due to the discretion which the Court has to exercise in the evolution and recognition of general principles of Union law and in particular when it comes to determine the precise contours of such a principle. In order to protect the authority of the Court's judgments, it becomes more and more vital to base judicial decision-making on comparative insights. Since the enlargement of the European Union goes along with an increase of legal orders which have to be taken into consideration when it comes to the recognition of general principles of EU law, the importance of comparative analysis is equally enhanced and the discretion which the Court has to exercise in this respect certainly becomes more delicate.
But, the increasing importance of comparative considerations in legal reasoning in EU law is, in particular, intensified by an evolution which has been initiated by national judiciaries and is enshrined in the concept of what is called "multilevel cooperation of courts" or Gerichtsverbund in the European Union. 23 between Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia from the US Supreme Court concerning the relevance of foreign law for the interpretation of the US Constitution has shown the conceptual difference in paradigmatic clarity, 25 the interpretation rule enshrined in article 39 of the South African Constitution of 1996, according to which the interpretation of fundamental rights has to respect international law and has to take account of foreign law, is certainly an instructive example of this recent evolution. 26 But, of course, it is of much greater practical importance to see that the ECJ has, by way of preliminary references, already been confronted with differences in the constitutional conceptions of different Member States and, on that basis, been asked to take those considerations into account when interpreting a fundamental right granted by the Charter of Fundamental Rights. 27 The interpretation of fundamental rights offers a particularly striking example for the growing need of comparative analysis and the search for an interpretation which takes account of the meaning given to an equivalent right. This consideration has to be highlighted in the European context of the protection of fundamental rights, which genuinely takes place in a multilayered system. On the national level, fundamental rights are protected by national constitutions and, in quite a number of states, by constitutions of federated entities. On the European level, fundamental rights of EU 25. See the grounds of the judgment written by Justice Kennedy for the majority in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U. S. 558, 576-77 (2003) with reference to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. In addition, see the dissenting opinion by Scalia, in Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868-69 (1988) See, e.g., Germany v. Y and Z, Joined Cases C-71/11 & C-99/11, [2012] E.C.R. I____, ¶ ¶ 42, 56-72. citizens are protected by the Charter of Fundamental Rights, by general principles of EU law, and by the fundamental rights enshrined in the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. Only for the latter convention, it is generally accepted that the human rights protected therein lay down minimal standards. 28 But, beyond the specific function of the Convention, as a matter of principle, it would be difficult for citizens to accept that the protection offered by fundamental rights with respect to EU institutions or acts undertaken by Member States to implement Union law would offer a lower level of protection than the one ensured on the national level against "purely" national acts of public authority. Differences in the level of protection would finally lead to a detrimental forum shopping in search of the most advantageous human rights protection 29 and provoke major difficulties in the delimitation of the respective jurisdictional competences. 30 But, beyond those general considerations which imply an enhanced degree of awareness for comparative law considerations in the protection of fundamental rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union goes even a step further in making such considerations mandatory. It is quite striking to see that article 52 of the Charter, specifically in paragraphs 3, 4, and 6, contains provisions which are much more elaborate and precise than the rather general rule contained in article 39 of the South African Constitution. In addition, it seems that those provisions form a set of complementary requirements which, as such, might cause difficulties and even create contradictions. Article 52, paragraph 3, states that for the Charter rights, which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down in the Convention. It is clarified that this provision does not prevent Union law to provide a more extensive protection. In the same line of reasoning but less imperative, article 52, paragraph 4, foresees that fundamental rights which are recognized by the Charter as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, shall be interpreted in harmony with those traditions. Finally, article 52, paragraph 6, holds that full account shall be taken to national laws and practices where the articles of the Charter contain a specific reference to national laws and practices.
Doubtlessly, those requirements have been included in the Charter in order to achieve a well-balanced and generally accepted standard of protection in the field of fundamental rights which should not differ too significantly from the traditions of the Member States. But, since those are far from being identical, the application of these interpretationguidelines is even more accentuated by the explanations to the Charter which have been drafted in order to give guidance in the interpretation of the Charter and which shall, according to article 52, paragraph 7, be given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States. For the time being, it is not yet foreseeable how the Court will face those different directives of interpretation which might, notably in a situation in which fundamental rights apply on the basis of multilateral relations, avoid incoherent results and, in particular, an open conflict between diverging requirements. It is even less predictable as to whether the ECJ will be able to apply those guidelines as a set of strict limitations to its judicial autonomy in the interpretation of the Charter rights or whether the need for an autonomous interpretation of the fundamental rights as it follows from the structure and the objectives of the Union will prevail. 31
II. RECENT JURISPRUDENCE OF THE ECJ ON THE RULE OF LAW
It should not be too much of a surprise that the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ on the rule of law was not triggered by the deviant behavior of Member States which is, as we will see later on, undoubtedly, in need of a reinforcement of the rule of law. The recent jurisprudence of the Court on the rule of law was rather provoked by the institutions of the European Union and, more generally, by what has become famous as the "war on terror." It was the mechanism of the so-called smart sanctions which the Security Council of the United Nations used inter alia against private individuals and associations, which has given rise to the question how the right of defense would and could be ensured in a situation in which the European Union was charged to implement the sanctions binding under the UN Charter. Already in 2008, in the landmark decision in the joined case Kadi and Al Barakaat, 32 the Court recognized the necessity for a full judicial review of such implementation measures of UN sanctions on grounds of fundamental rights granted by the legal order of the Union. The ECJ emphasized that the European Union is based on the rule of law inasmuch as neither the Member States nor its institutions can avoid review of the conformity of their acts with the treaty understood as "basic constitutional charter," which enables the ECJ to review the legality of acts of the institutions, even if those acts are undertaken in fulfillment of obligations resulting from international agreements. 33 
A. Effective Judicial Protection Against Restrictive Measures
On the basis of that truly fundamental component of the rule of law, the Court had to further develop the requirements of judicial control under the circumstances of the war against terror in the case of ZZ, concerning a decision to refuse entry to a Union citizen to the United Kingdom on imperative grounds of public security, which were essentially based on "closed evidence" and had, in accordance with national law, not been disclosed to ZZ. 34 Under those circumstances, the reference to the Court focused on the requirements of effective judicial protection and in particular on whether the essence of the grounds must be disclosed to the Union citizen concerned by such a decision. At the outset, the ECJ repeated the settled caselaw according to which the fundamental right to an effective legal remedy would be infringed if a judicial decision were founded on facts and documents which the parties themselves, or one of them, have not had an opportunity to examine and on which they have therefore been unable to state their views. 35 33. See Kadi and Al Barakaat Int'l Found., [2008] However, the Court noted that it may prove necessary not to disclose certain information to the person concerned, in particular in the light of overriding considerations connected with State security. If, in exceptional cases, reasons of State security are invoked to refuse full disclosure of grounds which constitute the basis of a decision taken under the directive 2004/38, the national court must have at its disposal and apply techniques and rules of procedural law which accommodate, on the one hand, legitimate State security considerations regarding the nature and sources of the information taken into account in the adoption of such a decision and, on the other hand, the need to ensure sufficient compliance with the person's procedural rights, such as the right to be heard and the adversarial principle. 36 In the context of the judicial review under directive 2004/38 the Member States must lay down rules enabling the court entrusted with review of the decision's legality to examine both all the grounds and the related evidence on the basis of which the decision was taken. The national courts with jurisdiction in that matter must carry out an independent examination of all matters of law and fact relied upon by the competent national authority and it must determine whether State security stands in the way of such disclosure. 37 If it turns out that State security in fact does stand in the way of precise and full disclosure, judicial review has to be carried out in a procedure which strikes an appropriate balance between the requirements flowing from State security and the requirements of the right to effective judicial protection whilst limiting any interference with the exercise of that right to what is strictly necessary. 38 The Court went on and established an essential distinction in that field. On the one hand, in order to comply with article 47 of the Charter, the person concerned must be informed, in any event, of the essence of the grounds on which a decision Kadi and refusing entry is based. On the other hand, the weighing up of the right to effective judicial protection against the necessity to protect the security of the Member State concerned is not applicable in the same way to the evidence underlying the grounds produced before the national courts, since disclosure of that evidence is liable to compromise State security in a direct and specific manner and may, in particular, endanger the life, health, or freedom of persons or reveal the methods of investigation specifically used by the national security authorities and seriously impede, or even prevent, future performance of the tasks of those authorities. 39 In such circumstances, the national court finally has to assess whether the failure to disclose the evidence is such as to affect the evidential value of the confidential evidence. 40 In the Kadi II judgment, concerning again the "blacklisting" of individuals under the circumstances of the war against terror, the Court transposed the essential requirements developed in ZZ to the freezing of economic resources on the basis of the inscription in a list drawn up by the Sanction's Committee of the United Nations. 41 On that basis, the Court went on to examine the different reasons on which Mr. Kadi had been listed and concluded whether those were sufficiently detailed and specific to allow for an effective defense. 42 Taking the comments of Mr. Kadi into account, the Court concluded that none of the allegations presented against Mr. Kadi in the summary provided by the Sanctions Committee were such as to justify the adoption of restrictive measures on the level of the European Union against him, either because the statement of reasons was insufficient or because information or evidence which might have substantiated the reason concerned, was lacking. 43 It should still be noted that the Court is, indeed, pursuing a balanced approach to the scrutiny of restrictive measures taken in the context of the fight against terrorism as it 39. Id. ¶ 66. 40. Id. ¶ 67. 41. Commission and Others v. Yassin Abdullah Kadi, Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P & C-595/10 P, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ 100-101 (referencing ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I-0000, ¶ ¶ 51, 53); id. ¶ ¶ 120, 125-29 (referencing ZZ, [2013] E.C.R. I____, ¶ ¶ 54, 57, 59, 61-64, 67 Without neglecting that the above mentioned jurisprudence is certainly due to a number of circumstances which are specific to this subject matter, it should still be underlined that the right to effective judicial protection is the most important right under the Charter invoked in proceedings before the Court since the Charter entered into force 46 and has therefore given rise to quite a number of remarkable jurisprudential evolutions. One of the most interesting evolutions concerns the enforcement of the right to effective judicial protection against the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time. In its earlier jurisprudence, the Court had been confronted with the plea and accepted that such a failure constituted a procedural irregularity. In the case of Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, the ECJ held that such a failure could justify a reduction of the amount of a fine imposed by the Commission in cartel-proceedings against an economic undertaking. 47 In a later case concerning a decision of the Commission finding that there had been abuse of a dominant position, the ECJ held that the failure of the General Court to adjudicate within a reasonable time can give rise to a claim for damages 48 . The Court had to reconsider this jurisprudence in the cases Gascogne Sack Deutschland, 49 Kendrion NV, 50 and Group Gascogne SA 51 and came to a quite comprehensive approach. Based on the settled case law of the Strasburg Court, the ECJ confirmed that a failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time must, as a procedural irregularity constituting the breach of a fundamental right, give rise to an effective remedy. 52 It went on explaining why the failure to adjudicate within a reasonable time can neither justify to set aside the judgment under appeal nor to annul the fine imposed by the contested decision. 53 On the question to reduce the fine imposed by the contested decision, the Court did not continue in the line of its jurisprudence in Baustahlgewebe v. Commission, but held that a claim for damages brought against the European Union pursuant to Articles 268 and 340, paragraph 2, of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union ("TFEU") constitutes an effective remedy of general application, which has to be brought first to the General Court, sitting in a different composition from that which heard the dispute giving rise to the claim for damages and only on appeal to the ECJ. 54 It will be for the General Court to evaluate the relevant criteria for assessing whether it had observed the reasonable time principle which the Court had exposed in Der Grüne Punkt 55 as well as the actual existence of the harm alleged and the causal connection between the harm and the excessive length of the legal proceedings. 56 The final consideration of the Court on the cases brought before it shows that the ECJ did not allow for an easy way out, but demonstrated that it is indeed committed to an effective remedy for asserting and penalizing the breach of article 47 of the Charter. In sum, this jurisprudence contains different messages. The most evident one is the demonstration that the ECJ's approach is, even without formal adherence to the convention, fully consistent with the settled case-law of the Strasburg Court. Hereby the ECJ is reinforcing its image as independent guardian in the field of fundamental rights in which it invariably applies its standard of review. A second message, addressed to the General Court, indicates that the failure to adjudicate in a reasonable period of time is to be taken seriously and will, beyond the negative public exposure, lead to a further increase in its workload. And a final message is addressed to the Union's political institutions and the Member States to live up to their common responsibility for the well-functioning of the judicial institutions of the Union. 57
C. Legislative Discretion and Judicial Scrutiny
While the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ on effective judicial protection is recognizably marked by the impetus which the entry into force of the Charter of Fundamental Rights has brought about, the recent jurisprudence on the rule of law relates as well to questions of general nature and, in particular, to an "eternal" question of any system of constitutional justice: The interrelation between legislative discretion and judicial scrutiny and more precisely the way in which the Court operates its control and how it is respecting the discretion which is attributed to the legislator in any constitutional democracy.
According to the settled case-law, the Court acknowledges that in the exercise of the powers conferred on the legislator of the European Union, it enjoys a broad discretion where its action involves political, economic, and social choices and where it is called on to undertake complex assessments and evaluations. In addition, where it is called on to restructure or establish a complex system, it is entitled to have recourse to a step-by-step approach. 58 As regards to the judicial review of compliance with constitutional requirements, such as the principle of proportionality, in the fields in which the European Union legislature has a broad legislative power, the lawfulness of a measure adopted in that sphere can be affected only if the measure is manifestly inappropriate, having regard to the objective which the competent institutions are seeking to pursue. However, even where it has such a discretion, the legislature must base its choice on objective criteria appropriate to the aim pursued by the legislation, taking into account all the facts and the technical and scientific data available at the time of the adoption of the act in question. When exercising its discretion, the EU legislature must fully take into account all the interests involved. In examining the burdens associated with various possible measures, it must be considered that, even if the importance of the objectives pursued is such as to justify even substantial negative economic consequences for certain operators, the exercise of the legislator's discretion must not produce results that are manifestly less appropriate than those produced by other suitable measures. 59 Where the European Union legislature is obliged to assess the future effects of rules to be adopted and those effects cannot be accurately foreseen, its assessment is open to criticism only if it appears manifestly incorrect in the light of the information available to it at the time of the adoption of the rules in question. 60 However, according to the case-law of the Court, the legislature is obliged, under certain circumstances, to consider the need for a review of the adopted measures. 61 As it appears from this jurisprudence, the ECJ does not issue a blank check to the EU legislature and operates various differentiations which allow for a well-balanced approach to this matter. In the Vodafone case, the Court placed much emphasis on the impact assessment which the Commission had presented in relation to the legislative proposal under scrutiny of the Court 62 in order to verify the rationality of the assessments operated in the legislative procedure. In doing so, the ECJ not only contributes to the success of the European Union's initiative for a "better legislation," 63 but adopts a properly balanced approach between legislative discretion and judicial scrutiny.
D. Balancing Fundamental Rights
The recent jurisprudence of the ECJ has not only demonstrated a reasonable reinforcement of the intensity of its scrutiny in general, but indicates in particular that the principle of proportionality has received lately an enhanced attention. According to settled case-law, the principle of proportionality requires that measures adopted by EU institutions do not exceed the limits of what is "appropriate and necessary in order to attain the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the aims pursued." 65 The Court carefully enhanced the intensity of its scrutiny in recent judgments with respect to any disproportionate nature of an obligation imposed on individuals insofar as it has to verify whether the legislature has met its obligation to strike a balance between the different interests at issue 66 and, in particular, whether the requirements arising from those different rights and freedoms have been carried out in order to reconcile them and to strike a fair balance between them. 67 The balancing exercise which the ECJ carefully undertook in the Schecke & Eifert case in 2010 concerned the reconciling of the objective of transparency protected under article 15 TFEU with the rights to privacy and the protection of personal data protected under articles 7 and 8 of the Charter and led the Court to an annulment of the contested regulation with respect to private individuals since it found that the EU institutions had not struck the required balance between the interests at stake. 68 On the basis of the same balancing test, the Court arrived at the opposite conclusion in Sky Österreich, in which the ECJ noted that the EU legislature was required to strike a balance between the freedom to conduct a business, on the one hand, and the fundamental freedom of citizens of the European Union to receive information and the freedom and pluralism of the media, on the other hand. 69 In the latter case the Court concluded that the legislature was entitled to adopt the contested rule on access to exclusive broadcasting rights for the purpose of making short news reports which limit the freedom to conduct a business and to give priority, in the necessary balancing of the rights and interests at issue, to public access to information over contractual freedom. 70 In Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others, 71 the ECJ only very recently declared the Data Retention Directive 2006/24 to be invalid, holding that the retention of the entire electronic telephony and internet traffic data of virtually all users in the European Union is a disproportionate measure for attaining the objective of public security. The ECJ explicitly stated that in view of the important role played by the protection of personal data in the light of the fundamental right to respect for private life as laid down in articles 7 and 8 of the Charter, and regarding the extent and seriousness of the interference caused by the data retention directive, the EU legislature's discretion is reduced and judicial review has to be strict. 72 The Court acknowledged that the fight against crime and terrorism is undisputedly of utmost importance and pointed out that everybody's right to security is laid down in article 6 of the Charter.
However, even such a fundamental objective of general interest does not, in itself, justify the retention measures such as established by the directive. On the contrary, the ECJ regarded the retention measures to be disproportionate, since the directive does not require any relationship between the data whose retention was provided for and a threat to public security. In particular, the directive is not restricted to a retention in relation (i) to data pertaining to a particular time period and/or a particular geographical zone and/or to a circle of particular persons likely to be involved in a serious crime, or (ii) to persons who could, for other reasons, contribute, by the retention of their data, to the prevention, detection or prosecution of serious 69. See Sky Österreich,[2013] offences. Furthermore, the directive does not provide any exceptions as to the persons concerned, with the result that it applies even to persons whose communications are subject to the obligation of professional secrecy.
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In addition, the directive fails to lay down any objective criterion which could ensure that the competent national authorities have access to the data and can use them only for the purposes of prevention, detection or criminal prosecutions concerning offences that may be considered to be sufficiently serious to justify such interference. 74 Also, the retention period of a minimum of six months and a maximum of twenty-four months does not distinguish between categories of data and their potential usefulness for the purpose of public security and is not based on objective criteria in order to ensure that it is limited to what is strictly necessary.
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Moreover, the directive also lacks sufficient safeguards, as required by article 8 of the Charter, to ensure effective protection of the data retained against the risk of abuse and any unlawful access. In this context, the Court added that the directive did not require the data in question to be retained within the European Union, with the result that control of compliance with the requirements of protection and security by an independent authority, as required by article 8 paragraph 3 of the Charter, was not fully ensured. Such control, carried out on the basis of EU law, is regarded by the ECJ as an essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.
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It can be concluded from the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ that the scrutiny of the Court tends to be increased in situations in which the proper balancing of different fundamental rights and freedoms or imperative grounds of public policy are at issue. 
E. Distribution of Powers Between the Institutions of the Union
Another important element of the rule of law, directly relating to the political checks and balances embodied in a constitutional system, concerns the distinction between the adoption of rules in matters which only can be enacted in the legislative process and matters which may be subject to rulemaking on the basis of implementing powers. In that respect, the adoption of rules essential to a subject matter is, according to settled case law, reserved to the legislature of the European Union. Therefore, the essential rules governing the matter in question must be laid down in the basic legislation and may not be delegated. 77 In a recent judgment on the Schengen Borders Code and in particular the surveillance of the sea external borders, the Court held that provisions which, in order to be adopted, require political choices falling within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature cannot be delegated and, furthermore, essential elements of a basic legislation cannot be amended nor supplemented by new essential elements enacted on the basis of implementing powers. 78 In that respect, the Court rejected the position taken by both the Council and the Commission and pointed out that ascertaining which elements of a matter must be categorized as essential, is not for the assessment of the European Union legislature alone, but must be based on objective factors subject to judicial review. 79 After having examined the contested decision in the light of the empowering-disposition contained in the basic legislation to take implementing measures, the Court judged that the adoption of rules on the conferral of enforcement powers on border guards entails, on one hand, political choices falling within the responsibilities of the European Union legislature in so far as it requires the conflicting interests at issue to be weighed up on the basis of a number of assessments. Depending on political choices, the powers of border guards may vary significantly and the adoption of such rules therefore constitutes a major development in the system of the Schengen Border Code. 80 On the other hand, the Court considered important to point out that provisions on conferring powers of public authority on border guards meant that the fundamental rights of the persons concerned may be interfered with to such an extent that the involvement of the legislature is required. 81 This judgment constitutes not only a major step to the evolution of a more elaborate system on the delegation of powers which is specifically addressed in articles 290 and 291 TFEU and currently under examination before the Court. 82 It may very well give a first indication as to how the Court might interpret the first condition contained in article 52, paragraph 1, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights requiring that any limitation on the exercise of the rights and freedoms recognized by the Charter "must be provided for by law." In any event, the Court has continued to enhance the responsibilities of the European Parliament, even to the detriment of Council and Commission. But it has not left out to underline that the crucial question which elements of a subject-matter must be considered as essential remains subject to its judicial review.
III. ENSURING THE RESPECT OF THE RULE OF LAW BY MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION
The foregoing observations on the recent jurisprudence of the ECJ relating to the rule of law quite clearly indicate that ensuring the rule of law offers more than enough challenges to the Court-even without considering the field of application which first comes to mind when the rule of law is mentioned in the context of European Union law and the process of European legal integration: the observance of the rule of law by the Member States of the European Union. Taken as such, this 80. See id. ¶ 76. 81. See id. ¶ 77. 82. See Commission v Parliament and Council, . subject covers the entire question of compliance of Member States with EU law and, in particular, the requirements resulting from the obligation to ensure a complete transposition of EU directives. In that respect, the recent Commission's 30th Annual Report on Monitoring the Application of EU law (2012) of October 22, 2013, gives an overview over the observance of EU law in general and by each Member State. 83 
A. Actual Context
In recent years, the observance of the rule of law by Member States of the European Union has primarily been discussed in the context of the public perception that the political evolution in a Member State might be in contradiction with the values of the Union enshrined in article 2 TEU. 84 In the actual discussion, reference has in particular been made to Hungary, 85 and recently to Romania, 86 but studies have shown that the situation relating to certain fundamental freedoms appears troublesome even in well-established Member States. 87 Beyond all difficulties to find common ground for an adequate evaluation of the respective situations and for the acceptance of the acting institutions, such as the Venice Commission, 88 the context of the legal discussion is framed by the inadequacy of the procedure foreseen in article 7 TEU which clearly cannot be considered as an operational or even suitable instrument to ensure the rule of law in the Member States of the European Union and the observance of the values enshrined in article 2 TEU. 89 Therefore, it seems to be quite generally accepted in academic literature that the procedure in article 7 TEU should be modified and "sharpened" in order to make it operational.
But since such a modification would require a revision of the treaty, the discussion has focused on other instruments which could practically be made available in due course. 90 A new conception of the field of application of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, fundamentally different from the one embodied in article 51 of this Charter, has forcefully been argued for. 91 In order to make such a concept workable in practice, a right of the ECJ to certiorari has been suggested. 92 Without going into a profound analysis of the different aspects which certainly will have to be taken into consideration when reflecting upon such a proposition, I wish to limit my remarks to some quite obvious comments. In the first place, it has to be borne in mind that the European landscape is far from being homogenous when it comes to the respect for the rule of law and for fundamental rights by individual Member States. In such a situation, an extensive reading of article 51 of the Charter-although possibly welcomed by some Member States as a European support for the respect of the rule of law and in particular of fundamental rights-would not only run counter to the article's wording and meaning as it results from the genesis and the general structure of article 51 and 52 of the Charter, 93 but it would also undoubtedly be considered as an unjustified "intervention" in those Member States, in which it is considered as a "sovereign" prerogative of the national constitutional court to ensure the observance of the rule of law and the fundamental rights enshrined in the national constitution. Therefore, such an approach would inevitably lead to an enhanced institutional controversy between the ECJ and national constitutional courts and, not to forget, the Strasburg Court. Despite a number of "invitations" addressed to the Court in that respect from national courts, the ECJ has so far refrained from an extensive reading of article 51, as is demonstrated by quite an impressive number of court orders declining its jurisdiction. 94 This prudent policy of institutional self-restraint is not only motivated by a well-balanced concept of a mutual respect for the jurisdiction both of national constitutional courts and the basic objective of the Strasburg system and the preservation of its integrity, but also reflects in particular a realistic selfunderstanding of the role attributed to the Court by the treaties of the European Union. Notably, it reflects a keen sense for the legitimacy of the Court and its limits which even after sixty years of European integration may still not be compared to the legitimacy of national supreme or constitutional courts. 95 In any event, an extensive interpretation of article 51 of the Charter would inevitably lead to a fundamental shift in the multilayered system of judicial protection between Member States, the European Union, and the ECJ and the conventional system of the Strasburg court, which might be perceived as largely duplicating the Strasburg system and in the end bear the risk of jeopardizing its very existence, at least for the Member States of the EU. Insofar as the problem to cure results from a deficient observance of the rule of law and fundamental rights beyond the field of application of EU law, given the historic mission of the Strasburg system it would seem logical to enhance its proper effectiveness. As understandable as it might be to foster the respect for the rule of law and fundamental rights by an application of the instruments resulting from EU law, 96 it should in the end not be forgotten that this cure only can be made available for EU Member States. Therefore such an approach would, in the long run, leave "what's left" to the Strasburg system and make it increasingly difficult to maintain the effectiveness and authority of this system which is much more in need for it than judicial protection in Europe elsewhere.
B. The Role of the ECJ in Ensuring the Respect of Rule of Law by EU Member States
In recent years as much as in the past, the Court has been confronted with alleged infringements of EU law by all Member States, although the number of infringement proceedings brought before the Court is currently declining. 97 The public debate on the political and constitutional evolution of some Member States and in particular of Hungary should not lead to the erroneous conclusion that it is only these Member States which are at the origin of proceedings relating to an alleged inobservance of the rule of law. It should rather be born in mind that even for well-established Member States the record on the observance of the rule of law is not beyond doubt. 98 But, of course, the Court has recently been confronted with cases relating to the political and constitutional evolution in Hungary and has made its contribution to ensure the respect of the rule of law in this country. 20, 27, 28, 32, 35, 37; see, e.g., Commission v. Belgium, Case C-577/10, [2012] 
Impressions of an Ongoing Integration Process
In the first place the Court was confronted with an application by Hungary to find, in essence, that the Slovak Republic had failed to fulfill its obligations under EU law in not allowing Hungarian President Sólyom to access Slovak territory on August 21, 2009, 99 for taking part in a ceremony to inaugurate a statue of Saint Stephen, the founder and first king of the Hungarian State. August 21st is considered to be a sensitive date in Slovakia, since it was on August 21, 1968 , that the armed forces of five Warsaw pact countries, which included Hungarian troops, invaded the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. With respect to the obligation resulting from the citizenship of the Union, the Court held that the right for all Union citizens to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States is subject to limitations resulting from international law applicable to the status of Mr. Sólyom as Hungarian head of State. 100 Since the presence of a Head of State on the territory of another State imposes an obligation to protection on the latter, the status of Head of State therefore has a specific character governed by international law, which is in fact able to justify a limitation on the exercise of the right of free movement conferred by article 21 TFEU and directive 2004/38. 101 The Court found as well that the refusal of the Slovak Republic to allow the President of Hungary access to its territory did not come under the concept of the abuse of rights as defined in the case-law of the Court. 102 If this case does not reveal important legal insight, the political incident on which it is based shows to the contrary quite impressively that the importance of good neighborly relations and mutual understanding of the delicate nature of historical events does not constitute an acquis to the same degree common to all Member States of the European Union.
A comparable sentiment is raised by a request for a preliminary ruling referred to the Court from a Hungarian Court of first Instance concerning, in substance, the question as to whether the conditions under which a special tax has been levied between 2010 and 2012 was constitutive of a disguised discrimination of foreign-owned undertakings. The Court held that the application of the steeply progressive scale to a consolidated tax base consisting of turnover provided for by the Hungarian legislation would entail indirect discrimination on the basis of the registered office of the companies, if it was liable to disadvantage undertakings linked within a group to companies established in another Member State on the Hungarian market. 103 
The Recent Constitutional Evolution in Hungary under
Review by the ECJ
The recent constitutional evolution of Hungary has been subject of two infringement procedures brought by the European Commission. 104 The first one, which concerned a national scheme requiring compulsory retirement of judges, prosecutors, and notaries on reaching the age of sixty-two and spread the flavor of a court-packing plan, 105 was decided on the basis of directive 2000/78 on combating discrimination, inter alia, on grounds of age. In that respect, the Court categorized the provisions at issue as instituting a difference of treatment based directly on age 106 and pursued its review on the question whether this difference in treatment based on age was objectively and reasonably justified by a legitimate aim and whether the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary. 107 In its subsequent review of this standard, the Court generously accepted that both the aim of standardization of employment relation in the public sector and the aim of attaining a balanced age structure can indeed constitute a legitimate aim of employment and labor market policy 108 and even acknowledged that the national provisions at issue were an appropriate means of achieving the aim of standardization pursued by Hungary. 109 But concerning the objective of establishing a balanced age structure, the Court held that the measures taken were not appropriate to achieve a truly balanced age structure in the medium and long terms. 110 On the decisive question of the proportionality of the age discrimination, the Court held that Hungary failed to provide any evidence to establish that more lenient provisions would not have made it possible to achieve the objective at issue 111 and concluded that the provisions at issue were not necessary to achieve the objective of standardization invoked by Hungary. 112 If the rather technical answer given by the ECJ might have caused some surprise to academic observers who were focusing on the constitutional and political nature of the measure at issue, the sober reasoning of the Court, strictly limited to the technicality of the matter, should be understood as bridging the gap which Hungary will have to overcome in accepting the judgment.
The second infringement procedure brought by the European Commission against Hungary concerns national provisions by which the six-year term of the data protection supervisor has been terminated before the end of the term in conjunction with the creation of a new national authority on data protection and freedom of information. 113 It was brought to the ECJ on the basis of directive 95/46, which provides for the creation of an independent authority charged with the supervision of the national law which Member States have enacted pursuant to this directive. In essence, it concerns the question of whether the requirement of independence, which the Court has highlighted in its settled case-law on that directive, 114 is infringed by a national measure bringing the term of the data protection supervisor to an end prior to the one foreseen in the mandate. Advocate General Wathelet held on the basis of the settled case law 115 that already the mere risk of any kind of influence on the decisions of the national authority on data protection and freedom of information is sufficient for an infringement of article 28, paragraph 1, second subparagraph, of the directive. 116 On the basis of this standard, he concluded that the measure in question is in fact contrary to the obligations resulting from the directive. In its judgment, the ECJ pointed out that the requirement to set up independent supervisory authorities on data protection derives from article 8 paragraph 3 of the Charter and article 16 paragraph 2 TFEU and is thus an essential component of the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data.
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The Court held that the independence requirement covers the obligation to allow supervisory authorities to serve their full term of office and to have them vacate office before expiry of the full term only in accordance with the rules and safeguards established by the applicable legislation. 118 Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under directive 95/46 by compelling the supervisor to vacate office in contravention of the safeguards established by statute, thereby compromising his independence.
IV. ENSURING THE RULE OF LAW-A NEVER ENDING STORY
The recent jurisprudence of the Court relating to the rule of law allows for a couple of conclusions which are, of course, drawn from a judge's perspective. It should not be surprising that the challenges which the ECJ has to meet in ensuring the rule of law in the European Union are, in essence, not much different from what national judges had and still have to cope with.
In the first place, this overview has shown in particular that, even in democratic societies in which the rule of law is traditionally respected in principle, it is not self-evident that the rule of law will in fact be observed when legislation has to meet new challenges. In that respect it should be stressed that the democratic nature and all public transparency of the political process are not sufficient to ensure the rule of law. For the protection of minorities and, in particular, of individuals, a reasonably intense judicial review both of individual decisions and legislative acts appears indispensable to effectively ensure the rule of law. Even in democratic societies it sometimes needs courage to resist to political and publicly dominating appreciations when the rule of law is endangered. It is therefore of crucial importance to monitor the full independence of judges on all levels. Secondly, the importance of comparative considerations has increased over recent years and will become more and more an indispensable condition for legal reasoning in the multilayered system of judicial protection in Europe. Today, the authority of our judgments requires that they appear convincing to judges in all European Member States who are primarily rooted in a particular national legal tradition and not familiar with the case-law of the Court. It is therefore a prerequisite for any further legal integration in Europe that the Court communicates on the basis of a legal reasoning which is, if not familiar, at least easily understandable to all its judicial counterparts. Finally, the rule of law is not a static concept. It grows and changes its profile with the evolution of society due to economic, social, technological, and political factors. If we need the respect for strong traditions in ensuring the rule of law, we need as well the openness of our minds to properly react to all new evolutions which endanger the rule of law and, thereby, to fully live up to the heritage of our founding fathers 119 : In order to finally replace the past striving for a domination of Europe by a rule of law in the European Union common to all its citizens, it is essential to understand the rule of law as a living instrument 120 which is shaped according to the challenges ahead.
119. See HALLSTEIN, supra note 2, at 341, 343-44. 120. The living-instrument-doctrine is primarily discussed in relation to the Strasburg court but formulates a legal reasoning widely shared in continental law
